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Each theory starts from a small set of foundational ‘hypotheses or axioms or
postulates or assumptions or even principles’ (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 15). Standard
economics rests on a set of behavioral axioms (Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p. v).
. . . there is more agreement on the defects of orthodox theory than there
is on what theory is to replace it: but all agreed that the point of the
criticism is to clear the ground for construction. (Nell, 1980, p. 1)
Boland aptly reminded critics what the real point is:
... if you think you can do better with a non-neoclassical model ..., then
you are quite welcome to try. (Boland, 1992, p. 19)
This challenge is taken up. The main thesis of the present paper is that human
behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization of the money
economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. The crucial point is not axiomatization
per se but the real world content of axioms (cf. Nell, 1984). The objective is to
make the implications of the structural axiom set concerning profit and interest
explicit and to contrast them with the familiar conceptions.
And similarly in economic theory, certain results . . . may be known
already. Yet it is of interest to derive them again from an exact theory.
The same could and should be said concerning practically all estab-
lished economic theorems. (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007, p.
6)
Accordingly, the formal frame that constitutes the pure consumption economy is set
up in Section 1. In Section 2 financial profit is defined. Then the interrelation of the
real and the monetary sphere is at first established in Section 3 for one single firm,
the bread maker. The introduction of the wine maker’s firm, that is characterized
by a different time structure of production, gives rise to a reallocation of labor and
constitutes the familiar choice situation between bread an wine. Relative prices
are determined by applying the zero profit condition. In Section 4 it is shown how
the time consuming process of wine making gives rise to a change of the monetary
transaction pattern which in turn creates the demand for credit. Credit is produced
by the banking unit of the central bank. How the reallocation of resources and the
production conditions of the banking unit determine the rate of interest is shown in
Section 5. In Section 6 the production process of wine is lengthened. The effects
of more roundaboutness on productivity and on the nominal/real rate of interest
are elaborated and compared with the results of the standard approach of Fisher.
In Section 7 the rate of interest is determined under the condition of profit ratio
equalization. To close the circle the classical capitalist is, in Section 8, finally
fitted into the structural axiomatic framework. It turns out that interest is not an
elementary income category and has to be replaced by distributed profit. Section 9
concludes.
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1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have
at first one world economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about
ascertaining the minimum number of objective premises.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment expen-
ditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other government activity.
2 Profit
The business sector’s financial profit in period t is defined with (4) as the difference
between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :
Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (4)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3), this definition is identical with that of
the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL ← YW ≡WL |t. (5)
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With (6) the expenditure ratio ρE , the sales ratio ρX , and the distributed profit ratio
ρD is added for formal convenience as:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW ← YD ≡ DN |t. (6)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that total consumption expenditures are equal
to total income, or, in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced; a
value of ρX = 1 of the sales ratio means that the quantities produced and sold are
equal in period t or, in other words, that the product market is cleared. If profits are
distributed the distributed profit ratio ρD is > 0. Definitions add no new content to
the set of axioms but determine the logical context of concepts (Stigum, 1991, pp.
35-36).
Using the 1st axiom in combination with (6) one gets from (4) the relation between
financial profit and the key ratios:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ⇒ Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t. (7)
In the pure consumption economy financial profit is greater than zero if the expendi-
ture ratio ρE is > 1 or the distributed profit ratio ρD is > 0, or both. If distributed
profit YD is set to zero, then profit or loss of the business sector is determined solely
by the expenditure ratio. For the business sector as a whole to make a profit con-
sumption expenditures C have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income
YW . So that financial profit comes into existence in the pure consumption economy
the household sector must run a deficit at least in one period. This in turn makes the
inclusion of the financial sector mandatory.
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspective.
For the firm price P, quantity X , wage rate W , and employment L in (5) seem to be
all important; under the broader perspective of (7) these variables play no role at all.
Both views are formally equivalent.
3 Bread and wine
The wine maker’s business is ‘a copybook example rightly favoured by economist’
(Wicksell, 1949, p. 172) to elucidate the nature and significance of interest.
For a clear-cut point of departure it is assumed that the output of the business sector
consists at first solely of bread, produced by firm A. Total employment L is given
and remains constant for the time being. Distributed profit is set to zero. In period1
the axioms then take the simplest form:
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Y =WAL OA = RAL C = PAXA |1. (8)
The bread is produced continuously and sold to the households. Wages, which
include the wages of management, are paid monthly at mid-month, that is, one
twelfth of total income Y . The wage rate W is by implication an average for the firm.
Under the condition that money consists of current deposits and current overdrafts at
the central bank this yields the perfectly symmetric transaction pattern of Figure 1.
All transaction are carried out by the transaction unit of the central bank which is a
firm like any other that pays wages and sells its services at a certain transaction price
to the households. The transaction unit is neglected in the following (for details see
2011b, Sec. 4).
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Figure 1: Monthly wage payments to the household sector at mid-month and continuous consumption
expenditures during period1
In period2 the wine maker takes up production. Total employment L splits up into:
L≡ LA +LB |2. (9)
Labor input LB moves from firm A to firm B. This entails that the production of
bread shrinks and the production of wine expands. Total income Y as given by (1)
is now composed of:
Y = WA︸︷︷︸
W
LA + WB︸︷︷︸
W
LB +(DANA +DBNB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD=0
|2. (10)
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To bar distracting secondary effects the wage rates are set equal for all firms and
distributed profits are excluded. Total income therefore does not change with the
reallocation of labor input.
The household sector apportions its consumption expenditures C as given by (3)
between the purchases of bread and wine:
C = PAXA +PBXB |2. (11)
Total consumption expenditures are equal to total income, i.e. ρE = 1. The house-
hold sector as a whole neither saves nor dissaves.
According to (5) the profits of the two firms are given by:
Q f iA ≡ PAXA−WLA
Q f iB ≡ PBXB−WLB |2. (12)
Under the condition that both markets are cleared, i.e. ρX = 1, this can be rewritten
as:
Q f iA = PARALA
(
1− W
PARA
)
if ρXA = 1
Q f iB = PBRBLB
(
1− W
PBRB
)
if ρXB = 1
|2. (13)
Overall profits are zero according to (7) because of ρE = 1 and ρD = 0. The zero
profit condition for a single firm reads WPR = 1. Under this conditions follows from
(13) that prices are equal to unit wage costs:
PA =
W
RA
PB =
W
RB
|2. (14)
In sum: relative prices PAPB are inverse to the productivity ratio
RA
RB
. Both markets
are cleared, the household sector’s budget is balanced and profits are zero for both
firms.
The production-possibility frontier (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998, pp. 19-22)
follows from the 2nd axiom (2) in combination with (9) and reads:
OA = RAL− RARB OB |t. (15)
Figure 2 shows the hypothetical choice between bread and wine that is open to
the household sector in period2. This choice determines the allocation of labor
input. The period view, though, is too coarse. The choice consists not only in
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a combination of output quantities OA and OB. While the bread comes daily the
wine’s date of delivery is by assumption New Year’s Eve because of the specific
production conditions of wine. Figure 2 refers to one single period but to different
time patterns of delivery within the period. In the undifferentiated period treatment
the time dimension of production is not present, that is, the choice situation is not
fully specified in the familiar graphical representation. The households choice is not
between x units of bread and y units of wine but between x continuously delivered
units of bread and y units of wine delivered at New Year’s Eve.
OA
OB
production-possibility frontier indifference curve tangential point
RA/RB
Figure 2: Alternative combinations of bread and wine open to the household sector in period2
The household sector chooses one point on the production-possibility frontier, but
we cannot say which one. The adduction of a set of indifference curves does not
really help much. It merely tells us that the marginal rate of substitution, which is
unknown, must be equal to the productivity ratio RARB which in turn is inverse to the
price ratio PAPB as we know from (14). It is therefore gratuitous to characterize the
selected point as consumer optimum. Any point can be characterized as an optimum.
All depends on how the unknown indifference curves are painted. This is a matter
of fantasy, not of analysis.
With the arbitrary choice of the output combination all real and nominal variables
are fixed under the conditions of market clearing, budget balancing, and zero profit
for all firms. This leaves only the monetary side to be determined.
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4 Transaction patterns and the need for credit
The transaction pattern in Figure 1 is quite simple because the households buy only
bread. When they buy also wine, conditions change. It is at first assumed that the
households make part payments for the wine that are evenly spread over period2.
Total consumption expenditures remain unaltered, they are now only distributed
between firms A and B. Then the transaction pattern looks the same as in period1.
The wine maker is in the position to pay the monthly wages exactly as the bread
maker does.
When the households pay their wine on delivery, though, the new transaction pattern
looks like Figure 3. The current deposits of the households accumulate during
period2 because the former part payments to the wine maker are now saved. By
consequence, the current overdrafts of the wine maker increase on account of
the monthly wage payments. The time consuming production of the wine is at
first financed by the transaction unit of the central bank. At New Year’s Eve the
households pay the wine in one amount and thereby the wine maker’s overdrafts
return to zero.
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Figure 3: The households pay the wine on delivery at New Year’s Eve
The saving of the households during period2 necessitates the financing of the wine
maker. Saving therefore uno actu creates the demand for credit of exactly equal
amount. Hence demand and supply are not independent as they are assumed to be in
partial analysis. The credit can take quite different forms. One rather unsophisticated
alternative to overdraft financing is that the wine maker takes up a one-period loan
at the central bank. The transaction pattern then changes as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The wine maker’s one-period loan is taken up at the beginning of period2 and repaid when
the households purchase the wine at New Year’s Eve
To handle loans, a separate unit is established at the central bank. It has to be
emphasized that only the central bank is capable of providing the one-period loan
at the beginning of period2. No classical capitalist stands ready to finance the
wine maker’s production process because none has as yet emerged from the pure
consumption economy. Therefore, the loan has to be created and only the central
bank can do this. The capitalist cannot be taken as historically given, he has to be
analytically brought into being from scratch.
5 The banking unit and the rate of interest
The inclusion of the banking unit in period2 entails that the given resources of the
business sector L have at first to be reallocated:
L≡ LA +LB +LC |2. (16)
As a consequence total income (1) differentiates to:
Y = WA︸︷︷︸
W
LA + WB︸︷︷︸
W
LB + WC︸︷︷︸
W
LC +(DANA +DBNB +DCNC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD=0
|2. (17)
Total income does not change. It is assumed that labor input moves from firm A
to firm C, hence the bread output diminishes. The concomitant increase in output
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consists of loan processing services. Being not storable, there can be no difference
between services produced O by the banking unit and services bought X , hence
OC = XC. The banking unit sells a quantity of loan services, which is related to the
stock of loans, at an interest rate IC to firm B. The banking unit’s profit follows from
(5) as:
Q f iC ≡ PC XC−WLC ⇒ Q f iC ≡ IC A¯C−WLC |2. (18)
The output OC and the quantity bought from the banking unit XC have to be adapted
to the specifics of the banking business and can be set equal to the average loan
stock A¯ (for details see 2011a, Sec. 5). Default risk, collateral and other peculiarities
of the lending business are neglected.
Firm B pays for the financial services, therefore its profit equation changes from (5)
to:
Q f iB ≡ PBXB− IC A¯C−WLB |2. (19)
By adding up (18) and (19) to total profits of the business sector interest cancels
out. Changes of the interest rate therefore do not affect total profit but only the
distribution of profits between firm A and B. From this follows that interest cannot
be interpreted as a part of profit or basically the same thing as profit. This, though,
was exactly what the classics did (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 925).
The reallocation of labor input is neutral with regard to the price of bread. When
labor input LC moves from firm A to C bread output falls. Since productivity and
wage rate remain unaltered the bread price PA remains steady according to (14).
The price of wine PB goes up compared to (14). This follows from (19) under the
condition that the profit of the wine maker is again zero.
PB =
W
RB
(
LC
LB
+1
)
if IC A¯C =WLC |2. (20)
The wine price now depends also on the relation of labor inputs in the banking unit
and the winery. When the banking business is small compared to the wine maker’s
business the wine price is close to unit wage costs. The labor input in the banking
unit LC depends on the volume of processed loans which is taken to be numerically
equal with the stock of loans A¯C.
Consumption expenditures, which remain unchanged since ρE = 1 and income is
constant, are redirected away from purchases of bread to purchases of the higher
priced wine:
C = PAXA +PBXB |2. (21)
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The quantity of bread XA diminishes. The quantity of wine XB is here kept constant
and the wine price PB increases. Total output of consumption goods is lower and
the price level is higher. The households buy indirectly the financial services of the
banking unit in the form of a higher price for the wine. Demand changes, expressed
by the shift of consumption expenditures, and supply changes, expressed by the
reallocation of labor, are perfectly symmetrical under the given conditions.
Compared to (13) the profit equations for the firms as given by (12), (19), and (18)
become more differentiated:
Q f iA = PARALA
(
1− W
PARA
)
if ρXA = 1
Q f iB = PBRBLB
(
1− W
PBRB
(
LC
LB
+1
))
if ρXB = 1
Q f iC = IC A¯C
(
1− WLC
IC A¯C
)
if ρXC = 1
|2. (22)
The zero profit condition demands that the expressions in the brackets be zero.
This then determines the relations of bread price, wine price, and rate of interest.
The inclusion of the banking unit and the appearance of the rate of interest on
loans results in a reallocation of demand and resources. The loan interest rate is
determined by the production conditions of the banking unit and given by a modified
form of unit labor costs:
IC =
W
A¯
Lc
this compares to IC =
W
R∗C
|2. (23)
The banking unit is not different from any other firm and the rate of interest is not
different from any other price except for the dimension (for details see 2011a, Sec.
5). The rate of interest remains unaltered if labor input and the average stock of
loans move in lockstep, in other words, if the loan processing productivity remains
unaltered.
The production-possibility frontier follows from the 2nd axiom (2) and (16):
OA = RA (L−LC)− RARB OB |2. (24)
Compared to Figure 2 the inclusion of the banking unit amounts to a parallel shift
of the frontier toward the origin as shown in Figure 5.
Because of the zero profit condition firm B does not bear the interest. Ultimately
the households pay it in the form of a higher wine price. In real terms they pay
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OA
OB
production-possibility frontier new frontier indifference curve tangential point
RA/RB
Figure 5: Forgone bread–wine output due to the reallocation of labor input to the banking unit
here in the form of less bread. Compared to the initial case of continuous part
payments households are worse off. It can be taken for granted that the households
cannot perceive the underlying connection between their transaction pattern, the
rate of interest and the fall of bread output due to the reallocation of labor. The
emergence of interest is in the last instance not effected by the time consuming
production process of wine but by the divergence of wage payments and sales
proceeds. These time divergences determine the financing requirement of the wine
maker. The volume of loans processed per period in turn determines the labor input
of the banking unit. The requisite diversion of labor input to the banking unit shifts
the production-possibility frontier of bread and wine toward the origin. In Figure
5 only bread is reduced but it is obvious that any other combination of bread and
wine on the production-possibility frontier is open to the household sector.
In sum: the rate of interest has not much to do with the production conditions
of the wine maker yet with the transaction pattern of the household sector and
the production conditions of the banking unit. Interest is, in the first instance, no
compensation for waiting or abstinence but a compensation for the loan processing
services of the banking unit. Under the conditions of market clearing, budget
balancing and zero profit for all firms the rate of interest is determined by the
productivity of the banking unit and it moves, given the productivity, with the wage
rate. The same is true according to (22) for the prices of bread and wine. Relative
prices are determined by the productivity ratios.
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6 Lengthening the production process
In the foregoing it has been assumed that the households buy the wine output at the
end of period2. As an alternative the case is now considered that the households
postpone their purchases until the end of period3. The resulting new transaction
pattern is depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: New transaction pattern in accordance with the lengthening of the production process
Not spending the whole period income means that the expenditure ratio ρE in (7) is
less than unity in period2. Financial saving is defined as the difference of income
and consumption expenditures:
S f i ≡ Y −C ≡ (1−ρE)Y ⇒ S f i = PB2XB2 |2. (25)
Saving is here equal to the amount that has been initially earmarked for the wine
purchase. Saving and the change of the household sector’s stock of money are two
aspects of the same flow residual (for details see 2012, Sec. 4).
With regard to profit the set of axioms is extended because additional variables have
to be introduced (for details see 2012, Sec. 6). The 5th axiom states that total profit
has a financial and nonfinancial component:
Q = Q f i +Qn f |t. (26)
Firm B’s financial profit follows from (19) and it is negative:
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Q f iB =−IC A¯C−WLB |2. (27)
Nonfinancial profit consists in the value of the unsold stock of wine:
Qn f = PBXB |2. (28)
Hence total profit as the sum of (27) and (28) is zero according to (19).
The winery makes no loss but faces a liquidity shortage. It is neither possible to
redeem the one-period loan nor to pay the interest. The one-period loan has not
only to be renewed but ramped-up by interest. In total the wine maker now has to
finance PB2XB2 plus the wage payments in period3, i.e. WLB3.
The higher loan amount affords more labor input in the banking unit. It is again
taken from firm A. The price of bread remains constant but total expenditures for
bread PAXA decline. The rate of interest remains unaltered because the productivity
and the wage rate in the banking unit stay where they are.
Taken all effects together, the price of wine at the end of period3 must be higher
compared to the price at the end of period2. This follows from (19) under the
condition of zero profit. The price increase is given by:
PB3−PB2 =
IC
(
A¯C3− A¯C2
)
XB3
(29)
The higher wine price is due to the higher loan amount which includes the accrued
interest of period2 and therefore entails compound interest.1 The required financing
in the two periods is given by:
A¯C2 =WLB2
A¯C3 =WLB2 (1+ IC)+WLB3
(30)
The difference in (29) is then given by:
A¯C3− A¯C2 = ICWLC2 +WLC3 (31)
The zero-profit conditions of (22) apply also to period3.
The households’ decision for point (A) induces the wine maker to lengthen the
production period in order to produce the two-period vintage. Thereby the quantity
of the wine remains by assumption unchanged only the quality changes. The higher
1 Wicksell derived the rate of interest from the higher prices of older vintages (Wicksell, 1949, pp.
174-176). This amounts to a petitio principii.
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price is necessary to recoup the wages of two periods and the interest. Interest in
turn is equal to the wages in the banking unit under the condition of zero profit. In
the final analysis interest resolves itself completely into wage income.
The household sector’s decision at the beginning of period3 is between wine of
actual production and future production as shown in the nominal and real part of
Figure 7.
PB3XB3
PB2XB2
Present and Future Wine - nominal
1+IC
(A)
(a) The nominal rate of interest, here IC, is given
by the slope of the nominal intertemporal trans-
formation line segment
XB3
XB2
Present and Future Wine - real
1+0
(A)
(b) The implicit real rate of interest, here zero,
is given by the slope of the real intertemporal
transformation line segment
Figure 7: Comparison of the nominal and implicit real rate of interest in the case of constant
productivity over two periods
The left part, 7a, shows the nominal trade-off between present and future wine. The
slope of the transformation line represents the nominal rate of interest which can be
derived from the respective values at the different points in time as:
Iwine ≡ PB3 XB3
PB2 XB2
−1≡ IC A¯C3 +WLB3
IC A¯C2 +WLB2
−1 ⇒ Iwine = IC |3. (32)
The nominal rate of interest that is derived from the time indexed values of the wine
is equal to the banking unit’s rate of interest.
Since the quantity of wine does not change the real trade-off between XB2 and XB3
is represented by the 45° angle in Figure 7b. The implicit real rate of interest is
therefore zero. An indifference curve has been adduced to establish the connection
to Fisher’s explanation of the rate of interest.
Fisher completed the analysis by expressing the interplay of the three
factors [future income, time preference, diminishing returns] in terms
of a modern general equilibrium framework. Eighty years later, his
solution may still be called definitive. (Niehans, 1994, p. 275)
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Figure 7b is basically identical with Fisher’s graphical representation (Niehans, 1994,
p. 275, Figure 23.1) and only differs with regard to the inclusion of diminishing
returns. Fisher’s production frontier is convex but this additional assumption is of no
consequence for the origination of the rate of interest. In the foregoing analysis it has
been assumed that point (A) is realized but actually any point on the intertemporal
line segment is possible.
Indifference curves are usually assumed to be asymmetrical with respect to a 45°
line through the origin and this entails for time preference:
A larger quantity today and a smaller quantity tomorrow is preferred to
the smaller quantity today and the larger tomorrow. (Niehans, 1994, p.
276)
By taking all assumptions together one arrives at the conclusion:
In pure logic it is easy, as Fisher shows, to construct situations in
which the rate of interest is zero or even negative, but the asymmetry
of both the indifference curves and the production frontier will almost
invariably give rise to a positive rate of interest even under stationary
conditions. (Niehans, 1994, p. 277)
It will be recalled that we have assumed that the quantity of wine XB remains
constant during period3 and that only the quality changes. It is of course possible
that the quantity diminishes somewhat in the process of fermentation. It this case
the implicit real rate of interest would be negative. This, though, has no effect on the
nominal rate of interest which is determined by (32). This rate is greater or at least
zero but cannot become negative. It is vital to keep the concepts of nominal and
implicit real interest strictly apart. The implicit real rate depends on the productivity
in the winery RB3 whereas the nominal rate depends on the productivity of loan
processing RC3 in the banking unit.
At the end of period3 the financial profit of firm B is positive because of the dissaving
of households, i.e. ρE > 1. Nonfinancial profit on the other hand is negative and
consists of the nominal depreciation of the hitherto owned stock of wine. Total
profit is again zero. Firm B is in the position to settle all its liabilities to the banking
unit in one amount.
To allow a closer look at the role of productivity wine is finally replaced by firewood.
Up to the beginning of period3 there is no great difference to the production of wine.
Only the output quantities and prices are diverse. This changes now insofar as it
is assumed that the quality of firewood remains the same but the quantity doubles
in the 3rd period. Under the conditions of market clearing, budget balancing and
zero profit for all firms this productivity increase effects a lower price of firewood at
period end. In nominal terms, though, there is no difference between Figure 8a and
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7a. In real terms the household sector’s hypothetical choice is between firewood
now or the double quantity at next New Year’s Eve or something in between as
depicted in Figure 8b. The implicit real rate of interest is now greater than zero
while it was exactly zero for the wine in Figure 7b.
PB3XB3
PB2XB2
Present and Future Firewood - nominal
1+JC
(A)
(a) The nominal rate of interest, here IC, is given
by the slope of the nominal intertemporal trans-
formation line segment
XB3
XB2
Present and Future Firewood - real
1+r
(A)
(b) The implicit real rate of interest, here greater
than zero, is given by the slope of the real in-
tertemporal transformation line segment
Figure 8: Comparison of the nominal and implicit real rate of interest in the case of increasing
productivity over two periods
The implicit real rate of interest as defined by (33) has obviously nothing in common
with the loan rate of interest. The lengthening of the production process increases
output due to the higher productivity in period3:
Ireal ≡ XB3
XB2
−1 ⇒ Ireal = RB3
RB2
−1 if LB3 = LB2. (33)
The nominal value of the output, though, is the same as in the case of wine. The
productivity effect leads to a lower price of firewood in view of the given conditions.
From this follows that the one-period vintage vanishes from the market after period3
because its price is higher than that of the two-period vintage while the quality is the
same. Firm B will reorganize its production schedule such that it is in the position
to bring a two-period vintage to market in each period. Hence there is no longer any
question of time preference for the households. However, for firm B the necessity to
finance the production process does not vanish and therefore the loan rate of interest
will stay above zero. The interest is embodied in the price of firewood as it was
formerly embodied in the price of wine. The productivity effect of the lengthening
of the production process affects the market price but not the rate of interest which
is the same in Figures 8a and 7a. From the point of conceptual consistency it is
important to note that the loan interest rate is a price for the services of the banking
unit while definition (33) is about a natural growth rate. The formal similarity of
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both rates has no deeper meaning. The relation between the real rate of interest and
roundaboutness is the fulcrum of the ‘Austrian habit of thought’ (Laidler, 1999, p.
33-36) which, from the structural axiomatic viewpoint, misses the crucial point.
7 The rate of interest in the general case
Hitherto profit has been set to zero for all firms. This made it easy to determine
the prices and the rate of interest. A positive profit for the economy as a whole
leads to indeterminacy and opens the opportunity for profit redistribution among
firms. Therefore, in order to eliminate all subjective elements and to determine the
rate of interest objectively an additional assumption is required. The most suitable
condition is profit ratio equalization.
The profit ratio of the banking unit follows from (18) and is defined as:
ρQC ≡ IC A¯CWCLC −1 cond. ρXC = 1 |t. (34)
The profit ratio of the wine maker follows from (19) and is defined as:
ρQB ≡ PB XB
IC A¯C +WB LB
−1 cond. ρXB = 1 |t. (35)
From the equalization of profit ratios (34)=(35) then follows the rate of interest:
IC =
1
A¯C
√PBRBLBWCLC +(12WB LB
)2
− 1
2
WB LB
 |t. (36)
The rate of interest depends on the price of the final product PB and on variables that
refer to labor costs in both firms. Given these variables the rate of interest moves
with the square root of the price of the final product under the conditions of market
clearing and equal profit ratios.
What remains to be determined is the price for the final product. To eliminate
the interdependencies that arise from profit ratio equalization among three firms
the analysis is focused on the interdependencies between the wine maker and the
banking unit. Consumption expenditures therefore are no longer split up between
two firms but go entirely to the wine maker:
C = PAXA︸︷︷︸
0
+PBXB |t. (37)
From the axiom set and (6) then follows under the condition of market clearing:
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PB = ρE (1+ρD)
W
RB
L
LB
L≡ LB +LC W ≡ 1L (WBLB +WCLC) ρXB = 1, ρXC = 1 |t.
(38)
The price of the final product depends on the expenditure ratio ρE , the distributed
profit ratio ρD, unit factor costs and the relative size of firm B. The expenditure ratio
is here equal for wage income and distributed profit. Inserted in (36) this finally
yields for the rate of interest under the condition of equal profit ratios:
IC =
1
A¯C
√ρE (1+ρD)WLWC LC +(12WB LB
)2
− 1
2
WB LB
 |t. (39)
In the general case the rate of interest depends on the demand for the final product,
which is determined by the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit ratio, and
on variables that refer to labor costs in both firms. Given these variables and the
distributed profit ratio the rate of interest decreases with saving, i.e. ρE < 1. The
case of ρE > 1 has to be excluded because dissaving of the household sector means
that the business sector makes a profit, which facilitates self-financing, and that the
household sector becomes the borrower. Household sector borrowing is analytically
different from business sector borrowing (for details see 2011a, Sec. 5). Since the
relation between higher saving and a lower rate of interest appears at first sight
commonsensical it is worth emphasizing that it follows without reference to the
time-honored conception of supply and demand in the market for loanable funds
(Mill, 2006, p. 647). The interrelation is here established by the condition of profit
ratio equalization. In the limiting case of overall zero-profit, i.e. ρE = 1 and ρD = 0,
the rate of interest depends alone on the labor costs of both firms.
Profit ratio equalization, though, is not a ‘law’ but at best a tendency. When this
tendency is not very strong more household saving translates one-to-one into a higher
demand of the business sector for loans. If it is satisfied profits are redistributed in
favor of the banking unit with the result that its profit ratio exceeds that of the wine
maker. From (34) and (35) the lower and upper bounds for the rate of interest are
derived as:
Imin =
WC LC
A¯C
Imax =
PB XB−WB LB
A¯C
|t. (40)
Reality will be found somewhere between this concrete values.2
2 “The economists have embarked on a fishing expedition in the hyperspace of possible worlds. The
trouble is that they have not caught any fish with the theoretical line. The activity works as science
only when it gets actual numbers to fish in. But economic speculation does not use actual numbers. It
makes qualitative arguments, such as existence theorems.” (McCloskey, 1994, p. 141)
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Since an expenditure ratio ρE < 1 implicates a financial loss for the business sector
as a whole, stability in the pure consumption economy requires an expenditure ratio
of unity. In this case total profit is determined by the distributed profit ratio. Under
the conditions of budget balancing and profit ratio equalization the rate of interest
moves, given the production conditions in both firms, with the square root of the
distributed profit ratio within the boundaries given by (40).
8 The classical capitalist and the notion of factor income
The banking unit’s profit is in no way different from the profit of any other firm.
This profit is either distributed to the household sector or retained. Let us assume for
the moment full profit distribution then the households receive from the banking unit
wage income in their capacity as workers and distributed profits in their capacity as
owners. The same applies to the winery. The interest that the wine maker pays to the
banking unit is in this limiting case completely resolved into wages and distributed
profits (cf. Smith, 2008, p. 57). The same applies to the revenues of the winery.
Interest is not an elementary income category.
It has been assumed hitherto that the wine maker’s operations were completely
financed by the banking unit of the central bank, hence the classical capitalist was
nonexistent. It is no problem, though, to fit this checkered economic character into
the given analytical frame. First of all the capitalist’s roles have to be separated.
The operation of lending entails a certain amount of administrative work that gives
rise to wage income. The role of the worker has to be separated from the role of
the pure capitalist. The capitalist proper is the owner of a firm that lends a certain
amount of money for a definite term. This firm makes a profit or loss like any
other firm. The distributed profit of the firm is the income of the pure capitalist.
There is no difference to the ownership of any other firm. The capitalist’s income
does not consist of interest but of distributed profit. Hence there is no need to
provide a justification for interest, not more in any case than to provide one for
the revenues of the winery. The rationale of distributed profits of the banking unit
or the analytically identical case of the pure capitalist is the same as for any other
firm; it consists of the ownership of the firm, however legally defined (Ellerman,
1986). Interest, therefore, is no factor income (cf. Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 264).
In the limiting case of zero profit for each firm the rate of interest is positive and
interest is equal to the wage income of the banking unit. In this case profit is zero
and by consequence distributed profit too, that is, the income of the pure capitalist
is zero. The existence of a positive rate of interest can in this case obviously not be
explained by psychological factors like waiting or abstinence. The rate of interest is
entirely determined by structural conditions. Interest has to be deleted from the list
of factor incomes.
The profit ratio is the general concept because it is also applicable to a pure con-
sumption economy without credit or capital. Defining the profit ratios (34) and
20
(35) meant relating profit to costs. The capitalist, though, may calculate differently.
Assumed that profits are fully distributed he may relate distributed profit to the
amount of money that has been lent and that is here equal to the firm’s equity. This
profit rate is therefore conceptually different from the profit ratio. Profit ratio equal-
ization, by consequence, is not the same thing as profit rate equalization. While the
firm’s equity remains unchanged the expected dividends and an apposite discount
rate determine, in principle, the price of the firm’s share. Profit rate equalization,
understood as the relation of dividend to share price, is therefore effected by the
adaptation of the share price.
According to (39) the interest rate depends on distributed profit. Yet distributed
profit is on the other hand the income of capitalists. Since the expenditure ratio
is unity in the viable pure consumption economy the capitalists fully spend all
distributed profit income. Their capital remains constant. In the final analysis
the intricate circular relationship between interest and distributed profit as well
as between profit and distributed profit is self-supporting at any level. For the
economy as a whole there exists no relation between profit, the rate of interest and
the productivity effect of a lengthening of the production process. For the individual
firm this relation exists but it is a logical mistake to jump from the conditions of the
individual firm to the economy as a whole.
9 Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
clarification of the logical origin of the rate of interest. The main results of the
structural axiomatic analysis are:
• The rate of interest has not much to do with the production conditions of the
wine maker yet with the transaction pattern of the household sector and the
production conditions of the banking unit. Interest is no compensation for
waiting or abstinence but a compensation for the loan processing services of
the banking unit.
• Under the conditions of market clearing, budget balancing and zero profit for
all firms the rate of interest is determined by the productivity of the banking
unit.
• The implicit real rate of interest can be negative. This, though, has no effect
on the nominal rate of interest which is greater or at least zero. The implicit
real rate depends on the productivity of the consumption goods producing
firm whereas the nominal rate depends on the productivity of loan processing
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in the banking unit. The implicit real rate of interest has nothing in common
with the loan rate of interest.
• The productivity effect of the lengthening of the production process affects
the market price of the final product but not the rate of interest.
• In the general case with non-zero profit for the economy as a whole the rate
of interest depends on the demand for the final product, which is determined
by the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit ratio, and on variables that
refer to labor costs in both firms.
• Under the conditions of budget balancing and profit ratio equalization the
rate of interest moves, given the production conditions in both firms, with the
square root of the distributed profit ratio.
• Interest is not an elementary income category. The classical capitalist’s
income does not consist of interest but of distributed profit.
Both, the classical and neoclassical theories of interest are incomplete. The structural
axiomatic approach enables an comprehensive analysis that covers the real, the
nominal, and the monetary aspects and provides actual numbers for the lower and
upper bound of the rate of interest.
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